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For all of its alleged progress, humankind is the author of truly
spectacular crimes. Dissatisfied with murder on a limited scale, it has
now established a procedure for the annihilation of entire peoples.
Casting a shadow over everything that might bring credit to an en-
dangered species, this procedure-more completely than any war-
blots out entire libraries of knowledge and whole oceans of sacred
poetry.
This procedure is genocide.' And "procedure" is an apt descrip-
tion. Unlike other earlier forms of organized violence against civil-
ians, 2 genocide is both passionless and systematic. Driven by abstract
commitments to "purity" rather than spontaneous spasms of hatred
and lust, it represents a carefully structured program for myriad ex-
ecutions. Unhindered by sentimentality, it proceeds deliberately, with
precision, content in the awareness that in the closing decades of the
20th century compassion is no longer a "problem."
What, exactly, is genocide? Based upon a combination of the
Greek genos (meaning race or tribe) with the Latin cide (meaning kill-
ing), it means the commission of certain specific acts with intent to
destroy, wholly or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group
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1. Genocide is a crime against humanity with precise jurisprudential meaning. It identi-
fies as criminal any of a series of stipulated acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such .... " Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III) art. 2 (1948).
2. Pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, civilians are "[p]ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause." Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 3, para. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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as such. Coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin,3 a Polish-Jewish lawyer
who escaped the German occupation of his homeland, it describes
what Winston Churchill once called "a crime without a name."' 4 In
this connection, it describes a crime that is juristically distinct from
other sorts of wartime killing (killing long since prohibited by the
laws of war of international law) and from other sorts of non-wartime
political repression.
According to Articles .II and III of the Genocide Convention,
which entered into force on January 12, 1951:
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately infficting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide. 5
Although legal scholars may understand that genocide has al-
ways been prohibited by international law,6 the post World War II
criminalization of genocide has been explicit and far-reaching. Build-
ing upon the norms established by international custom, the general
3. Lemkin was a jurist who initiated a one-man crusade for a genocide convention. In
1933 he "submitted to the International Conference for Unification of Criminal Law a propo-
sal to declare the destruction of racial, religious and social collectivities a crime" under inter-
national law. L. KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 22
(1981).
4. Id. at 12.
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
1, arts. 11, 111.
6. In the words of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, "Genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations and condemned by the civilized world." Id. preamble.
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principles of law recognized by civilized nations, the writings of
highly qualified publicists, various treaties and conventions and the
overriding principles of natural law, this criminalization has flowed
almost entirely from universal reaction to the Holocaust.
Prior to 1945, no principle of international law was more widely
revered in practice than the idea of "domestic jurisdiction" on matters
relating to human rights.7 On these matters, the rule of non-interven-
tion was effectively absolute.8 Thus, what went on within one State's
own borders was effectively no one else's affair.
In theory, of course, the idea of absolute non-intervention had
already been shattered by a number of pertinent treaties and conven-
tions before World War II. Both the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648
(ending the Thirty Years War) and the so-called Minorities Treaties
after World War I did undertake to protect specific groups within
States from inhuman treatment. During the period between these
norm-making agreements, the Treaties of Vienna (1815) provided for
abolition of the slave trade-abolition that was reinforced by provi-
sions of the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference (1890). And the Ge-
neva Convention of 1864 prescribed specific patterns for the treatment
of the sick and wounded in time of war. Yet, no truly universal, com-
prehensive and codified protection of human rights existed before
1945.
After the Second World War, the Nuremberg Tribunal was es-
tablished and in session (1945-1949). Based upon its Charter,9 this
specifically-constituted international court brought charges on three
categories of crime under international law: crimes of war; crimes
against peace; and crimes against humanity.' 0 It was from this last
category of crime-crimes against humanity-that the full criminal-
ization of genocide drew its sustenance and which established the
right and obligation of States to intervene in other States when human
rights are in grave jeopardy in other States. According to the British
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg:
Normally international law concedes that it is for the State to de-
cide how it shall treat its own nationals; it is a matter of domestic
jurisdiction .... Yet, international law has in the past made some
claim that there is a limit to the omnipotence of the State and that
7. See Driscoll, The Development of Human Rights in International Law, in THE
HUMAN RIGHTS READER 41 (1979).
8. Id.
9. The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 95(t), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
10. Id.
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the individual human being, the ultimate unit of all law, is entitled
to the protection of mankind when the State tramples upon its
rights in a manner that outrages the conscience of mankind ....
The fact is that the right of humanitarian intervention by war is
not a novelty in international law - can intervention by judicial
process then be illegal?II
In creating a greatly-strengthened human rights regime, princi-
pal responsibility fell on the newly-formed United Nations.12 Begin-
ning with a General Assembly definition and resolution in 1946
affirming the law-making quality of the Nuremberg judgment and
principles, 3 the United Nations went on to complete the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on De-
cember 9, 1948.14 This Convention, which removes any doubts about
the lawlessness of genocide, entered into force more than two years
later, when a sufficient number of signatory states had deposited their
instruments of ratification.15
The Genocide Convention was submitted to the Senate by Presi-
dent Harry Truman in June 1949. It languished in that body until
February 19, 1986, when the Senate finally consented to ratification
with the reservation that legislation be passed that conforms United
States law to the precise terms of the convention. This enabling legis-
lation was approved by Congress in October 1988, and signed by
President Reagan on November 4, 1988. Known widely as "The
Proxmire Act," to honor the long crusade of Senator William
Proxmire to secure United States support (the Wisconsin democrat
took the matter to the senate floor every day that it was in session for
11. See THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 71 (1949).
12. According to the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations:
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED... to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human per-
son, in the equal rights of men and women of nations large and small... AND FOR
THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace . . . HAVE RE-
SOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.
U.N. CHARTER preamble.
13. The Crime of Genocide, supra note 9.
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
1.
15. Id. From the point of view of international law, the significance of this modern
criminalization of genocide lies preeminently in its concern for a government's actions against
its own nationals. For as long as we have recognized the validity of laws of land warfare,
which is certainly since ancient times, genocidal action against enemy nationals during war-
time has been illegal. Since the end of World War II and the Nuremberg judgment, domestic
atrocities that meet the test of genocide have also been criminalized.
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19 years and gave more than 3000 speaches to urge its adoption), the
enabling legislation amends the Criminal Code of the United States to
make genocide a federal offense. It also sets a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act defined by
the law. With President Reagan's signature, the United States be-
came the 98th state to ratify the Genocide Convention.
Taken together with other important covenants, treaties and dec-
larations, which together comprise a human rights "regime," 16 the
Genocide Convention represents the end of the idea of absolute sover-
eignty concerning non-intervention when human rights are in griev-
ous jeopardy. The Charter of the United Nations-a multilateral,
law-making treaty-stipulates in its preamble and several articles that
human rights are protected by international law.' 7 This stipulation
was reaffirmed by major covenants in 196618 and by the Helsinki Fi-
nal Act of 1975.19 Of course, the United Nation's Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights 20 of 1948 must also be considered an integral
part of the human rights regime. Although this Declaration is not,
strictly speaking, a law-making document, it does articulate "the gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (a proper
source of international law under article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
16. On the human rights regime, see especially Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106(XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14),
U.N. Doc A/6014 (1966); International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
17. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55, 56.
18. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1967); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967).
19. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, Au-
gust 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
20. The United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a General Assembly
Resolution. Because such a resolution is not listed under the authoritative sources of interna-
tional law at article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, it is not, by itself, a
law-making document. It is, however, an authoritative expression of customary international
law and an elucidation of the law of the Charter. Moreover, its norms have now been codified
by the (1976) entry into force of an "international bill of human rights": International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 18.
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national Court of Justice) and it does represent an authoritative eluci-
dation of customary international law and the law of the Charter.
2'
Article 1 of the Charter lists a main purpose of the United Na-
tions as "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage or religion."' 22 Similarly, in article 55, the Charter seeks "uni-
versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or reli-
gion."' 23 And in article 56, all members of the United Nations "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article
55.' 24
The United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has been used to justify various actions by the organization, to justify
various human rights conventions and to exert influence on various
national constitutions. For example, when the International Cove-
nants were adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1966,
the provisions of the Declaration were effectively transformed into in-
ternational conventional law.
25
In promoting human rights, various special responsibilities de-
volve upon specific organs of the United Nations. Under article 13 of
the Charter, one function of the General Assembly is to assist "in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."' 26 In addition to re-
ferring human rights matters to certain permanent committees, the
General Assembly has-from time to time-established subsidiary or-
gans of an ad hoc character.27
21. Id.
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
23. Id. art. 55.
24. Id. art. 56.
25. See supra note 20.
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 13.
27. At its fifteenth session, the General Assembly, on December 14, 1960, adopted reso-
lution 1514(XV), entitled Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples. To ensure the implementation of this declaration, the General Assembly, by its
resolution 1654(XVI) of November 27, 1961, established a special committee "to examine the
application of the Declaration" and "to make suggestions and recommendations on the pro-
gress and extent of the Declaration." And by its resolution 2621(XXV) of October 12, 1970, it
adopted a program of action for the full implementation on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples. See THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL
AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS at 49,
U.N. Sales No. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/404/Rev. 1 (1981). See also Declaration on the Granting of
[Vol. 11:25
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Under article 62 of the Charter, the Economic and Social Coun-
cil is given certain responsibilities for promoting human rights.28
Additional responsibilities are conferred by article 64.29 The Com-
mission on Human Rights, established in 1946, is one of the funda-
mental commissions of the Economic and Social Council. Since its
inception, the Commission has worked toward submitting proposals,
recommendations and reports to the Council on matters regarding
virtually all aspects of human rights. Finally, it should be understood
that all of the other primary organs of the United Nations may from
time to time be concerned with the protection of human rights.
In light of these codified expressions of the international law of
human rights, it is abundantly clear that individual States can no
longer claim sovereign immunity from responsibility for gross mis-
treatment of their own citizens. Notwithstanding article 2(7) of the
Charter of the United Nations, which reaffirms certain areas of "do-
mestic jurisdiction," 30 each State is now clearly obligated to uphold
basic human rights. Even the failure to ratify specific treaties or con-
ventions does not confer immunity from responsibility, since all states
are bound by the law of the Charter and by the customs and general
principles of law from which this agreement derives. In the words of
former President Jimmy Carter before the United Nations on March
17, 1977:
The search for peace and justice also means respect for human dig-
nity. All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged them-
Independence to colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961). The principal criminalizing element of the human
rights regime with particular respect to apartheid is the International Convention on the Sup-
pression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068(XXVIII), 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
28. According to article 62 of the U.N. Charter:
(1) The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with
respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related
matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the
General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized
agencies concerned.
(2) It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
(3) It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with
respect to matters falling within its competence.
(4) It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, inter-
national conferences on matters falling within its competence.
Id. art. 62.
29. Id. art. 64.
30. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
1989]
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selves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no
member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its
citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid
its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwar-
ranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world. 31
The international regime on human rights also establishes, be-
yond any reasonable doubt, the continuing validity of natural law 32 as
the overriding basis of international law. This establishment flows di-
rectly from the judgments at Nuremberg. While the indictments of
the Nuremberg Tribunal were cast in terms of existing positive law,33
the actual decisions of the Tribunal unambiguously reject the proposi-
tion that the validity of international law depends upon its "positive-
ness" (i.e., its explicit and detailed codification). The words used by
the Tribunal, "'So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be
unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished,' ,,34 derive from
the principle: nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without a punish-
ment). This principle, of course, is a flat contradiction of the central
idea that underlies "positive" jurisprudence, the idea of law as com-
mand of a sovereign. 3
5
In fact, the tendency to disassociate the law of nations from the
law of nature and to identify international law exclusively with posi-
31. Address by President Jimmy Carter to the United Nations General Assembly, 13
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 397, 401 (1977).
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 925 (5th ed. 1979), states:
This expression, "natural law," orjus naturale, was largely used in the philosophical
speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was intended to denote a
system of rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct which, indepen-
dently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one people, might be discov-
ered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of and
conform to his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical
constitution. The point of departure for this conception was the Stoic doctrine of a
life ordered "according to nature," which in its turn rested upon the purely supposi-
tious existence, in primitive times, of a "state of nature;" that is, a condition of soci-
ety in which men universally were governed solely by a rational and consistent
obedience to the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such nature
being as yet undefaced by dishonesty, falsehood, or indulgence of the baser passions.
In ethics, it consists in practical universal judgments which man himself elicits.
These express necessary and obligatory rules of human conduct which have been
established by the author of human nature as essential to the divine purposes in the
universe and have been promulgated by God solely through human reason.
Id.
33. "Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority for the govern-
ment of an organized jural society . I..." Id  at 1046.
34. See A. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
106 (1970).
35. See supra note 32.
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tive law did not really appear before the nineteenth century. Prior to
that century, few scholars indeed were willing to advance the idea of
international law detached from natural law. With this in mind, we
may consider briefly the natural law origins of international law.
II.
The idea of natural law is based upon the acceptance of certain
principles of right and justice that prevail because of their own intrin-
sic merit. 36 Eternal and immutable, they are external to all acts of
human will and interpenetrate all human reason. This idea and its
attendant tradition of human civility runs almost continuously from
Mosaic Law and the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day.
It was in the land of ancient Israel that, for the first time, the
ideas of justice and law were firmly interwoven. Indeed, unlike the
Greeks, the early Jews did not have the problem of reconciling human
law with divine law. Since all law was seen to proceed from God, all
law was necessarily just. This idea of an undifferentiated legal order
extends to certain orthodox groupings within the contemporary State
of Israel, since the law of the Torah continues to guide their behavior,
even after some 2000 years apart from territorial organization. At the
same time, while early Jewish legal theory had no need for antinomy
between natural law and positive law, this theory-because it con-
strained humankind within a transcending order revealed by divine
word and interpreted by human reason-had the effect of strengthen-
ing natural law.
While the entire Torah does not purport to bind humankind as a
whole, a portion of it does display such intent. This view was shared
by early Christian authorities, who felt that a part of Mosaic Law is
clearly universal and that this part is necessarily written in the hearts
of all people. Jewish and Christian thought, therefore, have long been
in substantial agreement on the existence of a set of rules or precepts
of conduct that is universally binding and ascertainable by human
reason.
This area of agreement was broadened by the Stoics and trans-
mitted by the Romans. A century before Demosthenes elucidated the
idea of true law as an act of discovery, Sophocles challenged the supe-
riority of human rule-making in Antigone.37 Composed in 442 B.C.,
36. Id.
37. As suggested by Edward S. Corwin, "Creon typifies in Sophocles' drama the Greek
tyrant, whose coming had disturbed the ancient customary regime of the Greek city state." E.
1989]
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Antigone explores the basic conflict between the claims of the State
and the claims of individual conscience. Antigone's appeal against
King Creon's edict to the "unwritten and steadfast custom of the
Gods' 38 has since been taken to represent the incontestable
supremacy of a higher law over man-made tyrannical law. Plato con-
firms this representation in Meno,39 arguing that since any action that
conforms to an unjust law is unjust, that law itself cannot be consid-
ered worthyA0
Aristotle later advised advocates in the Rhetoric "that when they
had 'no case according to the law of the land,' they should appeal 'to
the law of nature.' "41 Quoting the Antigone of Sophocles, he argued
that "an unjust law is not a law."' 42 This position, of course, is in
contrast to the opinion of Sophists that justice is never more than an
expression of supremacy, an opinion long since associated with the
statement of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic: "Right is the interest
of the stronger. '4
3
Aristotle advanced the concept of "natural justice" in the Ethics:
"'Of political justice,' he wrote, 'part is natural, part legal-natural,
that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by peo-
ple's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent
... .'" The essential ingredient of justice, then, cannot be of the
State's own contrivance. It is a discovery from nature and a transcript
of its constancy. Its applicability, therefore, is timeless. "Not of to-
day or yesterday its force," says Antigone, "It springs eternal; no man
know its birth. '45
The Stoics regarded Nature itself as the supreme legislator in a
moral order where man, through his divinely granted capacity to rea-
son, can commune directly with the gods. As set forth in De Republic
and De Legibus, Cicero's concept of natural law underscores a princi-
ple that is very much a part of the United States constitutional foun-
dation: the imperative quality of the civil law is always contingent to
CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6
(1959).
38. Id.
39. Plato, Meno in 3 THE DIALOGS OF PLATO 11 (B. Jowett trans. 4th ed. 1953).
40. Id.
41. E. CORWIN, supra note 37, at 7.
42. Id.
43. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC § 338 (B. Jowett trans. 1875).




its being in harmony with reason.4 According to Cicero, justice is
not, as the Epicureans claimed, a matter of mere utility of the arbi-
trary construction of opinion.47 Rather, it is an institution of nature
that transcends expediency and that must be embodied by the positive
law before such normative obligations can claim the allegiance of
human conscience.48
But what is to be done when positive law is at variance with true
law? The Romans, who cherished the idea of true law as distinct
from positive law, had a remedy. They incorporated in their statutes
a contingency clause that a particular law could not abrogate what
was sacrosanct or jus (what is naturally just). On many occasions,
Cicero and others invoked jus against one statute or another. In this
way, the lex scripta (the written law), always no more than an artifact
of the civic community, remained subject to the test of conformance
with nature.
The Roman concept of a higher law was widely integrated into
medieval jurisprudential thought. According to St. Augustine's tract
On Free Will: "That which is not just, does not seem to me to be true
law."' 49 The same assertion is made in Book XIX, Chapter XXI, in
The City of God.50 Similarly, St. Thomas consistently said that an evil
precept is not law, but "iniquity,"51 and according to John of Salis-
bury's Policraticus, "[T]here are certain precepts of the law which
have perpetual necessity, having the force of law among all nations
and which absolutely cannot be broken." 52 Recognizing the idea that
all political authority must be intrinsically limited, John noted that
the prince "may not lawfully have any will of his own apart from that
which the law or equity enjoins, or the calculation of the common
interest requires. '5 3
Expanding upon the ancient theme of the dignity of man, which
appears in Genesis, pervades the Old Testament and was reinforced
by early Christian emphasis on the salvation of mankind and the in-
carnation of Christ.54 Renaissance philosophers underscored the
46. Id. at 9-10.
47. Id. at 10-11
48. Id. at 11.
49. D'ENTREVES, supra note 34, at 37.
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. at 43.
52. JOHN OF SALISBURY, POLITCRATICUS cited in DICKINSON, THE STATESMAN'S BOOK
OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 33 (1927).
53. Id. at 7.
54. See generally the HOLY BIBLE (King James).
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universality and centrality of human rights. However, it was left to
Pico's Oration on the Dignity of Man, to introduce a new element-
man's liberty or free choice. 55 Going beyond Giannozzo Manetti's
treatise, On the Excellancy and Dignity of Man 56 and Ficino's Theo-
logia Platonica,57 Pico recognizes not only man's uniqueness, but the
basis of this uniqueness, which is freedom.58
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, natural law
doctrine was reaffirmed and strengthened by Suirez, 5 9 Grotius60 and
Newton.61 Reviving the Ciceronian idea of natural law and its under-
lying optimism about human nature, Grotius must be credited with
freeing this idea from any dependence on ecclesiastical or Papal inter-
pretation. 62 Newton's English Deism provided scholars with the
foundations for entire systems from which juridical rights and obliga-
tions could be deduced with Euclidean precision. 63
Emmerich de Vattel's The Law of Nations (175 8),64 gave new em-
phasis to the natural law origins of international law. Arguing from
the assumption that nations are no less subject to the law of nature
than are individuals, he concluded that what one man owes to other
men, one nation, in its turn, owes to all other nations: "Since Nations
are bound mutually to promote the society of the human race, they
owe one another all the duties which the safety and welfare of that
society require. ' ' 65 With this in mind, Vattel went on to advance a
permanent standard by which we can distinguish between lawful and
unlawful practices in international affairs:
Since, therefore, the necessary Law of Nations consists in applying
the natural law to States, and since the natural law is not subject to
change, being founded on the nature of things and particularly
upon the nature of man, it follows that the necessary Law of Na-
55. Pico, Oration on the Dignity of Man in THE RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY OF MAN (E.
Cassirer ed. 1948).
56. Id. at 42.
57. FicINO, THEOLOGICA PLATONICA (1482).
58. Pico, supra note 55.
59. F. SUkRES, TREATISE ON LAWS AND GOD AS LEGISLATOR (G. Williams trans.
1944).
60. H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (W. Whewell trans. 1853).
61. I. NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy) (R. Thorp trans. 1968).
62. H. GROTIUS, supra note 60.
63. I. NEWTON, supra note 61.
64. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 4
(C. Fenwick trans. 1964).
65. Id. at xii.
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tions is not subject to change. Since this law is not subject to
change, and the obligation which it imposes are necessary and in-
dispensable, Nations cannot alter it by agreement, nor individually
or mutually release themselves from it.66
During the nineteenth century, politics enhanced the power of
the sovereign State and positivism began to encroach upon the valid-
ity of natural law. In its most extreme form, this positivism came to
regard the will of the State as the exclusive source of all international
legal norms. It came, therefore, to exclude from international law all
of the higher considerations of reason and justice.
In a very real sense, worldwide lack of concern for legal protec-
tion of human rights (including, ultimately, genocide) grew out of the
post-Westphalian system of world politics-a system that sanctified
untrammeled competition between sovereign states and that identified
national loyalty as the overriding human obligation. With these de-
velopments, unfettered nationalism and State centrism became the
dominant characteristics of international relations and the resultant
world order came to subordinate all moral and ethical sensibilities to
the idea of unlimited sovereignty. Such subordination was more than
a little ironic, since even Jean Bodin, who advanced the idea of sover-
eignty as one free of any external control or internal division, recog-
nized the limits imposed by divine law and natural law.67
In the words of the distinguished legal theorist, Charles de Vis-
scher, the growth of positivism "bled white" international law by
making the manifested will of the state the sole criterion of validity
for norms.68 Today, however, in the post-Nuremberg world order, we
have begun to return to an idea of international law that recognizes its
teleological character. Although it is probably unreasonable to claim
that we have returned to the classical/medieval idea of natural law's
preeminence over all human institutions, the present world legal order
has clearly discarded the notion that the State has its own morality
which displaces the notation of human community. This community,
as Francisco de Vitoria argued in 1532, remains the fundamental fact
against which the fractionation of humanity into smaller units should
not prevail.
69
66. Id. at 4.
67. J. BODIN, THE REPUBLIC (1576).
68. See C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW Vii
(P.E. Corbett trans. 1968).
69. F. DE VITORIA, THE LAW OF WAR MADE BY THE SPANIARDS ON THE BARBARIANS
(J. Bate trans. 1917).
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As an answer to the question, quidjus ?-"what is law?"-inter-
national law now rejects all empirical solutions that substitute force
for justice. Rather than accept the neo-Kantian distinction between
the "concept" and the "ideal" of law,70 international law now stipu-
lates that the concept and the ideal coincide. Evidence of such recog-
nition can be found in the documentary forms of the current human
rights regime and in the generally diminished willingness, by states, to
exempt internationally important activity from international legal
regulation by deference to the dogma of domestic jurisdiction. 71 For
example, the United Nations has persistently rejected South Africa's
invocation of article 2(7) to shield its practice of apartheid.
72
III.
What does all of this really mean? Admittedly, there now exists
a regime of binding international agreements that places worldwide
human welfare above the particularistic interests of individual States,
but what can this regime be expected to accomplish? Granted, there
are now explicit and codified rules of international law that pertain to
genocide, but what can be done about their effective enforcement?
Does not a consideration of post-World War II history reveal several
instances of genocide (the Cambodian case being, perhaps, the most
far-reaching and abhorrent)? Where was international law?
To answer these questions, one must first recall that international
law is a distinctive and unique system of jurisprudence. This is the
case because it is decentralized rather than centralized; because it ex-
ists within a social setting (i.e., the world political system) that lacks
government. It follows that in the absence of a central authoritative
institution for the making, interpretation and enforcement of law,
these juridical processes devolve upon individual States. It is, then,
the responsibility of these States to make international law "work"
with respect to genocide.
How can this be done? In terms of the law of the Charter,73 it is
essential that states continue to reject the article 2(7) claim to "do-
70. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (N. Smith trans. 1958).
71. See R. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782, 785 (1966).
72. On the particular crime of apartheid, see International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068(XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). See also International Convention on the Elimina-




mestic jurisdiction" whenever gross outrages against human rights are
involved. Of course, the tension between the doctrines of "domestic
jurisdiction" and "international concern" is typically determined by
judgments of national self-interest, but it would surely be in the long
term interest of all States to oppose forcefully all crimes against hu-
manity. As Vattel observed correctly in the preface to his The Law of
Nations in 1758:
But we know too well from sad experience how little regard those
who are at the head of affairs pay to rights when they conffict with
some plan by which they hope to profit. They adopt a line of pol-
icy which is often false, because often unjust; and the majority of
them think that they have done enough in having mastered that.
Nevertheless it can be said of States, what has long been recognized
as true of individuals, that the wisest and the safest policy is one
that is founded upon justice.
74
With this observation, Vattel echoes Cicero's contention that
"No one who has not the strictest regard for justice can administer
public affairs to advantage. '75 But how are we to move from assess-
ment to action, from prescription to policy? Where, exactly, is the
normative structure between the theory of human rights as pragmatic
practice and the operationalization of that theory?
Under the terms of article 56 of the Charter, as already noted,
member States are urged to "take joint and separate action in cooper-
ation with the Organization" to promote human rights.76 Reinforced
by the aforementioned ancillary prescriptions, this obligation stipu-
lates that the legal community of mankind must allow, indeed require,
"humanitarian intervention" by individual States in certain circum-
stances. Of course, such intervention must not be used as a pretext
for aggression and it must conform to settled legal norms governing
the use of force, especially the principles of discrimination, military
necessity and proportionality.77 Understood in terms of the longstand-
ing distinction between jus ad bellum (justice of war) andjus in bello
(justice in war), this means that even where the "justness" of humani-
74. See VAT-rEL, supra note 64, at 12a.
75. E. CORWIN, supra note 37.
76. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
77. The idea of proportionality is contained in the Mosaic lex talionis, since it prescribes
that an injury should be requited reciprocally, but certainly not with a greater injury. As
Aristotle understood the lex talionis, it was a law of justice, not of hatred---one eye, not two,
for an eye; one tooth, no more, for a tooth. JULIUS STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUS-
TICE 18-19 (1965).
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tarian intervention is clearly established, the means used in that inter-
vention must not be unlimited. The lawfulness of a cause does not in
itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence.
As for the legality of humanitarian interventionjus ad bellum, it
has been well-established for a long time. Although it has been
strongly reinforced by the post-Nuremberg human rights regime, we
may also find support for the doctrine in Grotius' seventeenth-century
classic, The Law of War and Peace.78 Here, the idea is advanced and
defended that States may interfere within the territorial sphere of va-
lidity of other States to protect innocent persons from their own rul-
ers, an idea nurtured and sustained by the natural law origins of
international law:
There is also another question, whether a war for the subjects of
another be just, for the purpose of defending them from injuries
inflicted by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that ever since
civil societies were formed, the rulers of each claimed some special
right over his own subjects.
Euripides makes his characters say that they are sufficient to
right wrongs in their own city. And Thucydides puts among the
marks of empire, the supreme authority in judicial proceedings.
And so Virgil, Ovid and Euripides in the Hippolytus. This is, as
Ambrose says, that peoples may not run into wars by usurping the
care for those who do not belong to them. The Corinthians in
Thucydides say that it is right that each state should punish its
own subjects. And Perseus says that he will not plead in defense of
what he did against the Dolopians, since they were under his au-
thority and he acted upon his right. But all this applies when the
subjects have really violated their duty; and we may add, when the
case is doubtful .... But the case is different if the wrong be mani-
fest. If a tyrant like Busiris, Phalaris, Diomede of Thrace practices
atrocities toward his subjects, which no just man can approve, the
right of human social connection is not cut off in such a case.
7 9
78. The idea expressed in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
that scholarly writings (of which Grotius' classic is an instance) are a proper source of interna-
tional law may have its roots in the following Jewish tradition-that a fellowship of scholars is
entrusted with legal interpretation. This idea, of course, diverges from the Jewish tradition in
that the Jewish scholars, rather than being actual sources of legal norms, were always bound
by the Talmudic imperative, "Whatever a competent scholar will yet derive from the Law, that
was already given to Moses on Mount Sinai." (Jerusalem Megillah IV) Yet, even this diver-
gence may not be as far-reaching as first supposed, since one view of the norm-making charac-
ter of scholarly writings on international law is that these writings are never more than
exegesis of overriding natural law and that their contributions to the development of interna-
tional law are always contingent upon being in harmony with reason or "true law."
79. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 60, Chapter XXV, Book VIII, §§ 1,2.
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The idea is supported by Vattel's argument in The Law of Na-
tions (1758): Nations have obligations to produce welfare and happi-
ness in other states. In the event of civil war, for example, states must
aid the party "which seems to have justice on its side' or protect an
unfortunate people from an unjust tyrant.1
80
While the theory of international law still oscillates between an
individualist conception of the State and a universalist conception of
humanity, the post World War II regimes of treaties, conventions and
declarations concerning human rights is necessarily founded upon a
broad doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, it is the very
purpose of this regime to legitimize an "allocation of competences"
that favors the natural rights of humankind over any particularistic
interests of State. Since violations of essential human rights are now
undeniably within the ambit of global responsibility, the subjectivism
of State primacy has been unambiguously subordinated to the endur-
ing primacy of international justice. In place of the Hegelian concept
of the state as an autonomous, irreducible center of authority (because
it is an ideal that is the perfect manifestation of Mind), there is now in
force a greatly expanded version of the idea of "international con-
cern." In the words of Messrs. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen:
The general community is made competent to inquire into how a
particular state treats, not merely aliens, but all individuals within
its boundaries, including its own nationals. Indeed, given the facts
of global interdependences and the intimate links between peace
and human rights, much of humankind appears to have come to
the opinion that nothing could be of greater "international con-
cern" than the "human rights" of all individuals.81
The starting point for Messrs. McDougal, Lasswell and Chen is
the following expression of normative objective:
The observational standpoint to which we aspire is that of citizens
of the larger community of humankind who identify with the
whole community, rather than with the primacy of particular
groups, and who are committed to clarifying and securing the com-
mon interests of all individuals in realizing human dignity on the
widest possible scale.
8 2
80. See VATTEL, supra note 64, at xii.
81. See M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL, AND L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTIS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 211
(1980).
82. Id. at xvii.
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As we have already seen, this starting point is not associated with
a new understanding of international law, but with a reformulation
and refinement of the long-standing idea of universality and reason.
And this long-standing idea is nurtured not only by the great text-
writers on jurisprudential thought, but also by the historic movements
for human freedom and human dignity, e.g., the English, American,
French, Russian and Chinese revolutions.
We have seen that within the current system of international law,
external decision makers are authorized to intercede in certain mat-
ters that might at one time have been regarded as internal to a partic-
ular State. While, at certain times in the past, even gross violations of
human rights were defended by appeal to "domestic" jurisdiction, to-
day's demands for exclusive competence must be grounded in far
more than an interest in avoiding "intervention." This trend in au-
thoritative decision-making toward an expansion of the doctrine of
"international concern" has been clarified by Lauterpacht's definition
of intervention:
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal con-
notation. It signifies dictatorial interference in the sense of action
amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies
a demand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of, or re-
course to, compulsion, though not necessarily physical compul-
sion, in some form.8
3
Intervention is not always impermissible, and any assessment of
its lawfulness must always be contingent upon intent. Applying Lau-
terpacht's standard, it follows that where there is no interest in exert-
ing "dictatorial interference," but simply an overriding commitment
to the protection of human rights, the act of intervening may repre-
sent the proper enforcement of pertinent legal norms. This concept of
intervention greatly transforms the exaggerated emphasis on "domes-
tic jurisdiction" that has been associated improperly with individual
national interpretations of article 2(7) of the Charter 84 and, earlier,
with article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations.85 By
offering a major distinction between the idea of self-serving interfer-
ence by one State in the internal affairs of another State and the no-
tion of the general global community's inclusive application of law to
83. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
85. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 8.
[Vol. 11:25
Prevention of Genocide
the protection of human dignity, it significantly advances the goal of a
genocide-free world order.
The importance of the changing doctrine of "intervention" to the
shift in global "allocation of competences" was prefigured by the Tu-
nis-Morocco case before the Permanent Court of International Justice
in 1923.86 In this case, the Court developed a broad test to determine
whether or not a matter is essentially within the "domestic jurisdic-
tion" of a .particular State: "The question whether a certain matter is
or is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state is an essen-
tially relative question: it depends upon the development of interna-
tional relations."
'87
Although this test is hardly free of ambiguity, it does clarify that
the choice between "international concern" and "domestic jurisdic-
tion" is not grounded in unalterable conditions of fact, but rather in
constantly changing circumstances that permit a continuing adjust-
ment of competences. It follows that whenever particular events
threaten to create genocide the general global community is entitled
to internalize jurisdiction and to authorize appropriate forms of deci-
sion and action.
Where conditions are judged to permit "humanitarian interven-
tion," say McDougal and his associates, the general community "may
enter into the territory of the defaulting state for the purposes of ter-
minating the outrage and securing compliance with a minimum inter-
national standard of human rights."88 This doctrine of humanitarian
intervention echoes E. Borchard's prior formulation in 1922:
Where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain
rights of its own citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute
sovereignty, the other states of the family of nations are authorized
by international law to intervene on grounds of humanity. When
these "human" rights are habitually violated, one or more states
may intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take
such measures as to substitute at least temporarily, if not perma-
nently, its own sovereignty for that of the state thus controlled.
Whatever the origin, therefore, of the rights of the individual, it
seems assured that these essential rights rest upon the ultimate
sanction of international law, and will be protected, in last resort,
86. Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, 4 P.C.I.J. 143 (Series B, 1923).
87. Id.
88. See McDOUGAL, supra note 81, at 239.
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by the most appropriate organ of the international community
89
Ironically, the United Nations, which is responsible for most of
the post-Nuremberg codification of the international law of human
rights, has sometimes been associated with increased limits on the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. These limits, of course, flow
from the greatly reduced justification for the use of force in the char-
ter system of international law, especially the broad prohibition con-
tained in article 2(4).90 Yet, while it cannot be denied that
humanitarian intervention might be used as a pretext for naked ag-
gression, it is also incontestable that a too-literal interpretation of arti-
cle 2(4) would summarily destroy the entire corpus of normative
protection for human rights-a corpus that is coequal with "peace" as
the central objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the impor-
tant nexus between peace and human rights, a nexus in which the
former is very much dependent upon widespread respect for human
dignity, a too-literal interpretation of article 2(4) might well impair
the prospects for long-term security. This is the case, as McDougal
and others have correctly observed, because "the use of armed force
in defense of human rights may be emphatically in the common inter-
est as a mode of maintaining international peace and security." 91
The actual practice of humanitarian intervention on behalf of be-
leaguered citizens of other States has ample precedent, prefiguring
even the current world legal order. One of the earliest recorded cases
of such intervention concerns an event that took place in 480 B.C.,
when Gelon, Prince of Syracuse, after defeating the Carthaginians,
demanded as one of the conditions of peace that the vanquished aban-
don the custom of sacrificing their children to Saturn. 92 In the nine-
teenth century, the high point of positivist jurisprudence, the
humanitarian intervention of Great Britain, France and Russia in
1927 was designed to end Turkey's particularly inhumane methods
against the Greek struggle for independence. 93 Similar aims, inter
alia, provoked U.S. intervention in the Cuban Civil War in 1898.
94
89. See E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 14 (1922).
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
91. See McDOUGAL, supra note 81, at 241.
92. See G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC IN-





Ironically, perhaps, in light of post World-War II relations between
the United States and Cuba, this intervention was intended to put an
end, in the words of the joint resolution of April 20, 1898, to "the
abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in
the island of Cuba; have shocked the moral sense of the people of the
United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization .... 95
Other cases come to mind as well. In 1902, on the occasion of
persecution of Jews in Rumania, the United States-while not a sig-
natory of the articles of the Treaty of Berlin (protecting the Balkan
minorities)--made a case for humanitarian intervention. If, said Sec-
retary of State Hay, the United States was not entitled to invoke the
clauses of the Treaty, "it 'must insist upon the principles therein set
forth, because these are principles of law and eternal justice.' "96
As we have seen, humanitarian intervention is one way of giving
effect to the enforcement of anti-genocide norms in international law.
Another way involves the use of courts, domestic and international.
Under article V of the Genocide Convention, signatory States are re-
quired to enact "the necessary legislation to give effect to" the Con-
vention. 97 Article VI of that Convention further provides that trials
for its violation be conducted "by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by any such interna-
tional penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction." 98
Here, there are some special problems. First, apart from the Eu-
ropean Human Rights Court at Strausburg,99 no such international
penal tribunal has been established. The International Court of Jus-
tice at the Hague has no penal or criminal jurisdiction. 10
The International Court of Justice does, however, have jurisdic-
95. Joint Resolution of the Congress Concerning Cuban Independence, Apr. 2, 1898,
cited in R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 194 (1968).
96. VISSCHER, supra note 68, at 127. Ironically, the United States expressed substantially
less concern for human rights during the Holocaust, when it abandoned the Jews of Europe to
visibly flaming crematoria. On this matter see especially D. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF
THE JEWS: AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1941-1945 (1984); A. MORSE, WHILE SIX MIL-
LION DIED (1986); and W. LAQUER, THE TERRIBLE SECRET: SUPPRESSION OF THE TRUTH
ABOUT HITLER'S FINAL SOLUTION (1980).
97. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
1, art. V.
98. Id. art. VI.
99. The European Human Rights Court was established by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, according to article 19, "[T]o
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties to the
present Convention."
100. See Statute of the International Court of Justice.
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tion over disputes concerning the interpretation and application of a
number of specialized human rights conventions. Such jurisdiction is
accorded by the Genocide Convention, article IX;101 the Supplemen-
tary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and In-
stitutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956, article 10;102 the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953, article 9;10 3 the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, article 38; 104 and
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, article 14.105
In exercising its jurisdiction, however, the International Court of Jus-
tice must still confront significant difficulties in bringing recalcitrant
States into contentious proceedings. There is still no way to effec-
tively ensure the attendance of defendant States before the Court.
Although many States have acceded to the Optional Clause of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (article 36, paragraph 2),
these accessions are watered down by many attached reservations. 10 6
In this connection, we may consider the case brought by Nicara-
gua against the United States. Notwithstanding the declaration is-
sued by President Harry S. Truman on August 14, 1946 accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (after
two-thirds of the Senate had given their approval), 10 7 the Reagan ad-
ministration has rejected such jurisdiction in the complaint presented
by the Sandinista government. 0 8 Driven by antipathy for an alleg-
edly Marxist regime in this hemisphere, the president decided upon a
101. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
1, art. IX
102. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T.
3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 40.
103. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909,
T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
104. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. This
convention should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. The effect of the Protocol is to revise article 1 of the Conven-
tion to make the Convention applicable to events occurring after January 1951.
105. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 14, Dec. 13, 1975.
106. Perhaps the best known of such reservations is that of the U.S. Connally Amend-
ment, according to which the United States excludes from its acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America." 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 11-12 (1947).
107. Id.
108. On June 27, 1986 the International Court of Justice declared in the Military Activities
case (also known as the Nicaraguan Mining Case) that the United States had violated custom-
ary international law with respect to aggression against Nicaragua and had also violated the
"object and purpose" of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, Navigation and Protocol, Jan.
21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, May 24, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024.
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course of action in willful violation of international law. Such ac-
tion-in this case generated by the overriding imperatives of geopoli-
tics-illustrates the difficulties involved in using the International
Court of Justice to prevent all crimes under international law.
Second, courts of the States where acts in violation of the Geno-
cide Convention have been committed are hardly likely to conduct
proceedings against their own national officials excluding, of course,
the possibility of courts established by a successor government. °9
What is needed, therefore, is an expansion of the practice of States
after World War II-a practice by States that had been occupied dur-
ing the war-of seeking extradition of criminals and of trying them in
their own national courts.
Let us briefly review the basic contours of this practice:
After the Second World War, three judicial solutions were
adapted to the problem of determining the proper jurisdiction for try-
ing Nazi offenses by the victim States, solutions that were additional
to the specially-constituted Nuremberg Tribunal.
The first solution involved the creation of special courts set up
expressly for the purpose at hand. This solution was adopted in Ru-
mania, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Poland.110
The second solution, adopted in Great Britain, Australia, Can-
ada, Greece and Italy, involved the establishment of special military
courts. I I'
The third solution brought the Nazis and their collaborators
before ordinary courts-a solution accepted in Norway, Denmark
and Yugoslavia. This solution was also adopted by Israel, although-
strictly speaking-the State of Israel did not exist at the time of the
commission of the crimes in question." 
2
109. An interesting example is the case of Argentina, where a civilian court, on December
9, 1985, convicted five members of the former junta (including two former presidents) for
human rights abuses. Those convicted oversaw a nightmarish campaign of extermination and
disappearances that resulted in more than 9000 deaths. The systematic abuses in Argentina
began with a 1976 coup that brought the military to power; they ended only after a disastrous
war with Britain occasioned a return to democracy. The trial that convicted former heads of
state (four other former military leaders were acquitted) was the first of its kind in recent Latin
American history. In the eight-month trial, more than 1000 witnesses offered harrowing re-
ports about the torture, kidnapping and murder of innocent victims.
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Significantly, this third solution did not end in the years immedi-
ately following the war. As recently as May 14, 1986, an ordinary
court in Yugoslavia convicted a major Nazi war criminal of ordering
the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people during World War
11.113 This tribunal of five judges sentenced Andrija Artukovic, for-
mer interior minister of the puppet state of Croatia who was
nicknamed the "Butcher of the Balkans," to death by firing squad."
4
And John Demjanjuk, identified as responsible for the deaths of tens
of thousands of Jews at Treblinka and Sobibor, was found guilty on
all counts of war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and crimes
against humanity by an Israeli court in the spring of 1988. The sen-
tence of death is now under appeal.' 15
In the future, there need be no war or occupation to justify the
use of domestic courts to punish crimes of genocide. There is nothing
novel about such a suggestion since a principal purpose of the Geno-
cide Convention lies in its explicit applicability to non-wartime ac-
tions. Limits upon actions against enemy nationals are as old as the
law of war in international law. But the laws of war do not cover a
government's actions against its own nationals. It is, therefore, pri-
marily in the area of domestic atrocities that the Genocide Conven-
tion seeks to expand pre-existing international penal law.
Going beyond article VI of the Genocide Convention, which
holds to the theory of "concurrent jurisdiction" (jurisdiction based on
the site of the alleged offense and on the nationality of the offender),
any state may now claim jurisdiction when the crime involved is geno-
cide. There is already ample precedent for such a rule in international
law, a precedent based upon the long-standing treatment of "common
enemies of mankind" (hostes humani generis) or international outlaws
as within the scope of "universal jurisdiction." In Vattel's 1758 clas-
sic, The Law of Nations, the following argument is advanced:
[W]hile the jurisdiction of each State is in general limited to pun-
ishing crimes committed in its territory, an exception must be
made against those criminals who, by the character and frequency
of their crimes, are a menace to public security everywhere and
proclaim themselves enemies of the whole human race. Men who
by profession are poisoners, assassins, or incendiaries may be exter-
113. Andrija Artukovic had been extradited to Yugoslavia on the order of U.S. Federal
Magistrate Volney Brown. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, § 1, at 20, col. 6.
114. Id.
115. Demjanjuk had been extradited to Israel from the United States. Demjanjuk v. Pe-
trovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985).
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minated wherever they are caught; for they direct their disastrous
attacks against all Nations, by destroying the foundations of their
common safety.'
1 6
Vattel's argument echoes the sixth century A.D. Corpus Juris
Civilis, especially chapter III, "ubi de criminibus agi oportet,"1 17 and
Grotius' The Law of War and Peace, especially Book II, chapter
20.118 It also parallels the whole corpus of cases, since antiquity, in-
volving piracy (hostes humani generis) and is built into the four Ge-
neva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose
upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain
grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction is
committed or the nationality of the authors of the crime in ques-
tion. 1 9 Most importantly, the post-Nuremburg international legal or-
der obligates States to recognize universal jurisdiction in punishing
crimes against humanity. Such punishment directly concerns each
.State since fundamental human rights have now been consecrated by
international law as an imperious postulate of the general community
of humankind. By acting in compliance with this postulate, each
State protects the interests of this entire community at the same time
as it safeguards its own interests.
The case for universal jurisdiction in matters concerning geno-
cide is further strengthened by the difficulties surrounding extradi-
tion. In this connection, the best example is the case of Israel in the
apprehension, trial and punishment of Adolph Eichmann. In 1950,
Israel enacted the Nazis and the Nazi Collaborators Punishment
Law.' 20 In this enactment, Israel did nothing different than other
states that had been occupied during the war, although-of course-
the State of Israel did not exist at the time of the commission of the
crimes. 12' Yet, its subsequent efforts to obtain certain major war
116. See VATrEL, supra note 64, at 93.
117. CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS (C. Kolbert trans. 1979).
118. VATTEL, supra note 64.
119. See art. 49 of Convention No. 1, art. 50 of Convention No. 2, art. 129 of Convention
No. 3, art. 146 of Convention No. 4, Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
120. For a full account of this law, see G. HAUSNER, supra note 110.
121. In response to the issue of Israel's non-existence at the time of the Holocaust, Gideon
Hausner-who prosecuted Adolph Eichmann before the Jerusalem District Court-makes the
following point:
The argument that Israel did not yet exist when the offenses were committed was
highly technical. She could certainly, as a member of the family of nations, claim her
right to share in the universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Moreover,
the State of Israel had grown from the Jewish community in Palestine, which had
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criminals (e.g., Joseph Mengele) from Argentina and elsewhere via
extradition were improperly rebuffed. 122
Why were the refusals to extradite contrary to international law?
For the most part, these refusals were grounded in the argument that
the crimes in question were of a "political nature."' 23 Although there
is a "political offense" exception to the international law of extradi-
tion, this exception is explicitly precluded by the Genocide Conven-
tion in cases involving crimes against humanity. 124 Moreover, under
the formula, extradite or prosecute, the States refusing extradition
were obligated to prosecute the alleged offenders themselves. Need-
less to say, no attempts at prosecution were ever undertaken. Finally,
these refusals to extradite were contrary to long-standing principles of
international law as elucidated by the teachings and writings of
highly-qualified publicists. According to Vattel, for example:
If the sovereign of the country in which the crimes of this nature
[i.e., crimes involving "common enemies of mankind"] have been
committed requests the surrender of the perpetrators for the pur-
pose of punishing them, they should be turned over to him as being
the one who has first interest in inflicting exemplary punishment
upon them; and as it is proper that the guilty should be convicted
after a trial conducted with due process of law, we have another
reason why criminals of this class are ordinarily delivered up to the
States in which the crimes have been committed. 125
Yet Vattel recognized that extradition could not always be ex-
pected and that the interests of justice could be served only through
been internationally recognized since 1917, under the Balfour Declaration and later
under the Peace Treaty, which gave it the status of a "Jewish National Home." Pal-
estinian Jews had fought under their own flag in World War II; post-war Israel had
been recognized by the Western Allies as having been a cobelligerent and had been
invited to join them in terminating the state of war with Western Germany.
G. HAUSNER, supra note 110, at 315.
122. A more recent case is that of Alois Brunner (aka Georg Fischer), one of Adolph
Eichmann's top aides and responsible for the deportation of over 100,000 Jews to Nazi death
camps. Although West Germany has requested Brunner's extradition from Syria, where he
has been living since 1960 (reportedly working for the Syrian secret police), Damascus claims
that it has no knowledge of this war criminal. This response flows from current rivalries in the
Middle East, where Syrian extradition might appear as a victory for Israel.
123. Although an increasing number of treaties and conventions dealing with international
crimes have adopted the formula aut dedre autjudicare (extradite or prosecute), an exception
is normally made when the offense in question is of a political nature. This exception is largely
a manifestation of the importance now attached to peremptory norms of Human Rights.
124. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
1, art. VII.
125. See VATrEL, supra note 64, at 93.
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the universalization of jurisdiction on matters concerning hostes
humani generis.126 Thus, he also understood that "pirates are hanged
by the first persons into whose hands they fall."'127 Under such rea-
soning, Israel's secret service (Mossad) abducted Eichmann in Buenos
Aires and returned him to Jerusalem for trial and, ultimately, execu-
tion. 1 28 Had it not acted on the correct principle of "universal" juris-
diction, "Eichmann would almost surely never have been brought to
trial for the offenses he committed."'
129
During the time that the abduction and trial took place, there
was no longer any legal or technical difficulty with the idea of "crimes
against humanity" (or its derivative, "crimes against the Jewish peo-
ple") since the issues of retroactivity, superior orders and tu quoque
had already been resolved at Nuremberg. 30
With respect to the issue of retroactivity, Nuremberg established
that there had been operative certain principles of positive law at the
time of the crimes (e.g., the laws of war, international custom, the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and the writ-
ings of qualified scholars) and of natural law.'31 Moreover, the Tribu-
nal concluded that retroactivity need not be unjust and that, indeed,
its application might be necessary to the interests of justice. In the
words of the Tribunal, "So far from it being unjust to punish him, it
would be unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished"-nul-
lum crimen sine poena. 1
32
Regarding its judgment on Adolph Eichmann, the Israeli court
built upon this reaffirmation of natural law, noting that there may be
special occasions and circumstances for which the law, for want of
foresight, failed to make provision.1 33 Moreover, citing an important
case from English law, the Israeli court offered a vital conceptual dis-
tinction between retroactive law and ex-post-facto law. Drawn from
Blackstone's Commentaries, this distinction held that "ex post facto
laws are objectionable when, after an action indifferent in itself is
committed, the legislator then, for the first time, declares it to have
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See G. HAUSNER, supra note 110.
129. Id.
130. Id. Ch. 15.
131. See D'ENTREVES, supra note 34, at 110.
132. See Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nu-
remberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, 42 vols, IMT secretariat (947-49), cited in A.
D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 110 (1951).
133. G. HAUSNER, supra note 110, at 412.
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been a crime and infficts a punishment upon the person who has com-
mitted it .... Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that
an action, innocent when it was done, should afterwards be converted
to guilt by subsequent law.13 4 He had, therefore, no cause to abstain
from it and all punishment for not abstaining must, in consequence,
be cruel and unjust." 135 In the Eichmann case, of course, the laws
involved did not create a new crime and it certainly could not be said
that he did not have criminal intent (mens rea). The accused's actions
were hardly "indifferent" and they were assuredly considered crimes
at the time of their commission by all civilized nations.
With respect to the issue of superior orders, the classical writers
on international law had long rejected that doctrine as a proper de-
fense against the charge of war crimes. The German Code of Military
Law, operative during the war, provided that a soldier must execute
all orders undeterred by the fear of legal consequences, but it added
that this would not excuse him in cases where he must have known
with certainty that the order was illegal. 136 This view was upheld in
an important decision of the German Supreme Court in Leipzig in
1921.137 According to the Court, a subordinate who obeyed the order
of his superior officer was liable to punishment if it were known to
him that such an order involved a contravention of international
law. 138
The defense of "superior orders" was also rejected at the Einsatz-
gruppen Trial undertaken by an American military tribunal. 139 Ac-
cording to the tribunal: "The obedience of a soldier is not the
obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent. It is a
fallacy of widespread consumption that a soldier is required to do
everything his superior officers order him to do. The subordinate is
bound only to obey the lawful orders of his superior."' 14
Ironically, Goebbels himself spoke against the plea of superior
orders during the war. In an article in the German Press on May 28,
1944, he wrote:
No international law of warfare is in existence which provides that










by pleading as his defence that he followed the commands of his
superiors. This holds particularly true if those commands are con-
trary to all human ethics and opposed to the well-established usage
of warfare. 
4 1
It was the bombing of Germany by the Allies to which Goebbels re-
ferred, and he was attempting to justify the Nazi practice of shooting
captured Allied airmen.
With respect to the issue of tu quoque, it was irrelevant in Jerusa-
lem since Israel had obviously not been a belligerent during World
War II. Hence, it was logically impossible that its capacity to sit in
judgment over Eichmann would have been compromised by any mis-
deeds of its own.
It follows from this discussion that Israel's trial of Adolph Eich-
mann was fully consistent with the post-Nuremberg imperatives of
international law and that its jurisdiction in the matter flowed prop-
erly from the universal nature of the crime and from the particular
suffering of the Jewish people. The crimes set forth by Israeli law
(namely crimes of war and crimes against humanity) had been unam-
biguously established as crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
human rights regime derivative from that Tribunal. The special
charge of crimes against the Jewish people derived properly from the
principle of "sovereign equality" and from Israel's inherent right as a
State (albeit constituted after the war) to punish those who would do
it harm. This special charge also derived properly from the overrid-
ing imperatives of natural law.
All of the crimes set forth under the Israeli indictment had there-
fore been recognized by the universal conscience of mankind and by
its institutionalized legal expressions as being delicta juris gentium
(crimes of international law). And since an international tribunal
which might have judged these crimes did not, for the moment, ex-
ist, 142 Israel properly invested its legislative and judicial organs of
State with the power of enforcement. In so doing, it acted upon the
well-established practice that each State reserves the right to punish a
crime which is a violation of the norms of the law of nations, regard-
less of the place in which the deed was committed or the nationality of
the accused or of the victim. In acting to punish the crime of geno-
cide, Israel acted to safeguard not only its own interests, but also the
141. Id. at 48.
142. Nuremberg, it should be noted, dealt only with "humanity," and not with "the Jew-
ish People."
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interests of the entire community of humankind. By acting upon the
principle of universal jurisdiction, it established beyond any reason-
able doubt that the punishment of genocide is not an internal question
for each State but a peremptory obligation of humankind.
In terms of the broad issue of using domestic courts to uphold
international law, the example of the United States has reserved the
right to enforce international law within its own courts. The United
States Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Of-
fenses against the Law of Nations."'' 43 Pursuant to this Constitutional
prerogative, the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Stat-
ute.144 This statute authorized United States federal courts to hear
those civil claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" when the alleged
wrongdoers can be found in the United States. 45 At that time, of
course, the particular target of this legislation was piracy on the high
seas.
Over the years, United States federal courts have rarely invoked
the "law of nations," and then only in such cases where the acts in
question had already been proscribed by treaties or conventions. In
1979, a case seeking damages for foreign acts of torture was filed in
the federal courts. 146 In a complaint filed jointly with his daughter
Dolly, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a well-known Paraguayan physician and art-
ist and an opponent of President Alfredo Stroessner's genocidal re-
gime, alleged that members of that regime's police force had tortured
and murdered his son, Joelito. 47 On June 30, 1980 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit found that since an international consen-
sus condemning torture has crystallized, torture violates the "law of
nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. 48 United States
courts, it was held, therefore have jurisdiction under the statute to
hear civil suits by the victims of foreign torture, if the alleged interna-
tional outlaws are found in the United States. 49
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
144. The Alien Tort Claims Act Provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The statute was enacted as part of
the first Judiciary Act of 1789, I Stat. 73, 77 (1848).
145. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
146. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
147. Id. at 878.
148. Id. at 877.
149. See I. Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International Torture, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov.
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Although this case was a civil suit brought by a dissident against
a representative of the Paraguayan regime, the court held, in effect,
that torture is a violation of the law of nations and can be redressed in
United States courts. At the moment, a unit of the United States
Human Rights Commission has been working toward a treaty that
would establish a universal criminal jurisdiction especially for tortur-
ers-an idea that could ultimately be extended to perpetrators of
genocide.
The obligation of United States courts to identify and punish
gross violations of international law concerning human rights is
roughly analogous to these courts' traditional role in redressing depri-
vations of civil liberties that occur at home. In the words of Judge
Irving R. Kaufman, who wrote the opinion of the Court in Filartiga:
In many respects, there is a parallel between Filartiga and the
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Mississippi, which held that
state-court murder convictions based on confessions obtained
through torture were unconstitutional. Just as our Federal courts
traditionally defer to the judicial findings of state courts, Ameri-
cans are reluctant to interfere in overseas disputes between two for-
eign nationals. But where torture is involved, on the state or
international level, the Federal courts have no choice. The articu-
lation of settled norms of international law by the Federal courts,
much like their adherence to constitutional precepts, is an expres-
sion of this nation's commitment to the preservation of fundamen-
tal elements of human dignity throughout the world.'
50
With this in mind, it would be enormously useful-in reference to the
crime of genocide-if the United States were to expand its commit-
ment to identify and punish such crimes within its own court struc-
ture and if other States were prepared to take parallel judicial
measures.
IV.
We all know, however, that States are typically animated by
forces other than an acutely moral imagination and that the presumed
requirements of realpolitik, or power politics, invariably take prece-
dence over those of international law. It follows that before the pro-
gressive codification of anti-genocide norms can be paralleled by the
9, 1980, at 52. The author, a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, wrote the opinion of the court.
150. Id.
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widespread refinement and expansion of pertinent enforcement meas-
ures, individual States must come to believe that international legal
steps to prevent and punish genocide are always in their own best
interests. Drawing upon the Thomistic idea of law as a positive force
for directing humankind to its proper goals (an idea that is itself de-
rived from Aristotle's conception of the natural development of the
State from social impulses), we need to seek ways of aligning the anti-
genocide dictates of the law of nations with effective strategies of im-
plementation-i.e., strategies based on expanded patterns of "human-
itarian intervention," transnational judicial settlement, and domestic
court involvement.
To accomplish this objective, primary attention must be directed
toward harmonizing these strategies with the self-interested behavior
of States. Here, it must be understood that the existence of even a far-
reaching human rights regime is not enough. Before this regime can
make productive claims on the community of States, the members of
this community will need to calculate that such compliance is in their
respective interests. Ultimately, this sort of calculation will depend,
in turn, on the creation of a new world order system-a planetary
network of obligations stressing cooperative global concerns over ad-
versary relationships. The centerpiece of this new world order system
must be the understanding that all States and all peoples form one
essential body and one true community.
But how might such an understanding come into being? How,
exactly, might a system based on conflict be transformed into a coop-
erative world public order of human dignity? How can we meet the
challenge of "planetization?" What particular transition strategies
need to be examined?
To answer these questions, we need to focus on the shaping of a
new political consciousness. In this connection, special attention
must be directed to the overriding obligations of natural law and to
the corollary subordination of national prerogatives to essential
human rights. The false communion of modern States is inwardly
rotten, time-dishonored and close to collapsing. A communion based
on fear and degradation, its mighty efforts on behalf of power and
aggrandizement have occasioned a deep desolation of the human
spirit. To unhinge this "communion" while there is still time, inter-
national angst must give way to real community and humankind's
store of international ideals must yield a gentle and new harmony.
Before this can happen we must first understand that there are
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many particular reasons for the ascendance of genocide, but only one
that is both necessary and correctable. This is the changing embrace
of realpolitik or power politics in world affairs, a sinister caress that
subordinates all humankind to the imminent needs of the State.
Although it has long been observed that States must always search for
an improved power position as a practical matter, the glorification of
the State is a development of modem times. This glorification, repre-
senting a break from the traditional political realism of Thucydides,
Thrasymachus and Machiavelli, was fully elaborated in Germany.
From Fichte and Hegel, through Ranke and Von Treitschke, the
predatory advance of realpolitik has sanctified a kingdom of sys-
temwide and systematic murder.
Today the State assumes its own rationale. Holding its will as
preeminent, it has become a sacred phenomenon, intent upon sacrific-
ing private interests and personal life at the altar of global competi-
tion. A stand-in for God, the State is now a providence of which
everything is accepted and nothing expected. The fact that it is pre-
pared to become an executioner State is not hard to reconcile with its
commitment to goodness, since both mass butchery and progress are
expressions of the sacred and are mutually related through the sacred.
The genocidal impulse of realpolitik can take several forms. It
can flow from the presumed imperatives of colonialism or from the
trauma of decolonization. It can stem from the search for "moderni-
zation" and consolidation of national power, or from the need to rid
the State of "impure" elements. And it is often nurtured by the inter-
est of States to preserve geopolitical alignments with other States. In
a world of competition and conflict, this interest-vital to national
power position-overrides considerations of individual dignity and
human rights. Thus, genocide is made possible not only by the execu-
tioner States themselves, but by their alliance partners.
The problem, then, is largely the place of the state, both in the
arena of planetary interaction and in the lives of its own citizens.
Before we can move toward a new and effective anti-genocide regime
in international law, the long-standing bellum omnes contra omnes
(war of all against all) must give way to a new affirmation of global
singularity and solidarity. States, like individual persons, are ce-
mented to each other not by haphazard aggregation, but by the cer-
tainty of their basic interdependence. Beneath the diversities of a
seemingly fractionated world, there exists a latent oneness. With the
manifestation of the "one in the many," States may begin to aim at
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particular goals and objectives in harmony with all other States. Un-
like anything else, this manifestation can endow the search for plane-
tization and freedom from genocide with real potency.
The problem of the omnivorous State, subordinating all moral
sensibilities to the idea of unlimited internal and external jurisdiction,
was foreseen brilliantly in the 1930s by Jose Ortega y Gasset.' 5' In
his The Revolt of the Masses, Ortega correctly identifies the State as
"the greatest danger," mustering its immense and unassailable re-
sources "to crush beneath it any creative minority which disturbs it-
disturbs it in any order of things: in politics, in ideas, in industry.' 5 2
Set in motion by individuals whom it has already rendered anony-
mous, the State establishes its machinery above society so that hu-
mankind comes to live for the State, for the governmental apparatus:
"And as, after all, it is only a machine whose existence and mainte-
nance depend on the vital supports around it, the State, after sucking
out the very marrow of society, will be left bloodless, a skeleton, dead
with that rusty death of machinery, more gruesome than the death of
a living organism."'
5 3
Rationalist philosophy had derived the idea of national sover-
eignty from the notion of individual liberty, but cast in its post-West-
phalian expression the idea has acted to oppose human dignity and
human rights. Left to its own nefarious devices, the legacy of unim-
peded militaristic nationalism can only be the subordination of all
human concerns to the imminent ends of the State. Ultimately, as
Lewis Mumford has observed, all human energies will be placed at
the disposal of the military "megamachine," with whose advent we
are all drawn unsparingly into a "dreadful ceremony" of world-wide
human sacrifice.'
5 4
The State flees reason because its people flee intimate awareness
of themselves. And this awareness, of course, is informed by the al-
ways latent potential of humankind to produce evil. In the final anal-
ysis, it is the fatal synergy of ineradicable human inclinations with
expanding national power that makes genocide possible.
It follows that our immediate efforts will be directed not at a
151. See J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 121 (1932).
152. Id.
153. Id
154. See L. MUMFORD, THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE: THE PENTAGON OF POWER
(1970), a book that climaxes with a series of studies that began with Technics and Civilization
in 1934. Mumford identifies the wholesale miscarriage of "megatechnics" that has misdirected
our human energies and brought us closer to a permanent state of degradation. Id.
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suitable transformation of human behavior (a transformation that
may or may not be possible) but rather at the idea of the State as the
primary and preeminent locus of human obedience. As long as this
idea holds sway, human solitariness will find full sustenance and give
rise to perpetual infamy. As long as this idea remains sanctified, it
will give rise to a disintegrating landscape of irrationality in which
only chaos can remain truly comprehensible.
With its objectification of individuals into vast networks of social,
economic and political manipulation, the all-powerful State prods
people to choose evil with pure heart. Since they will do evil for the
sake of the good, i.e., for the State, they will inevitably look upon
themselves as sanctified evildoers. The hater, the potential genocider,
is a person who is afraid, not-to be sure-of his scapegoats, but of
himself, of his fate, of change, of his instincts. Left to his own devices,
he is merely a coward whose tendency to murder is censured and for-
bidden. Encouraged by politics, and protected by the glorious ano-
nymity of the mob, this tendency knows no bounds. A pitiless stone
who once dared to kill only in effigy, he now becomes part of a furious
torrent of genocidal destructiveness.
We must not permit the State to provide this kind of encourage-
ment. To meet this objective, we first need to consider how power is
structured internally within States and how it is exercised between
them. Above all else, this means a search for ways of minimizing
violence and degradation by elites against their own citizens and by
governments against each other. And this search must be tutored by
the understanding that there exist important connections between
these different arenas of power, i.e., elites who maintain internal rule
by violent means of coercion are also inclined to view such coercion as
the principal instrument of interaction with other States, and vice
versa.
One important manifestation of this nexus is large-scale
scapegoating by the State. No other practice, perhaps is as closely
associated with the dynamics of international statecraft. Faced with
dissidence and disaffection at home, and unwilling to respond to the
causes of dissatisfaction by enlarging the prospects for social and eco-
nomic justice, the State often re-directs everyone's attention from do-
mestic affairs to foreign ones. Here, the State "solves" its
overwhelming internal problems by making justice a matter of tri-
umph over an external enemy and by focusing on a heroic foreign
cause. As Mumford points out:
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Hence the sense of joyful release that so often has accompanied the
outbreak of war ... popular hatred for the ruling classes was clev-
erly diverted into a happy occasion to mutilate or kill foreign ene-
mies. In short, the oppressor and the oppressed, instead of fighting
it out within the (ancient) city, directed their aggression toward a
common goal - an attack on a rival city. Thus the greater the ten-
sions and the harsher the daily repressions of civilization, the more
useful war becomes as a safety valve. 
155
Another important manifestation of this nexus is the unwilling-
ness of certain States to intervene on behalf of oppressed peoples
within other States where such intervention is viewed as geopolitically
self-defeating. Nurtured by a social-Darwinian conception of world
politics and by a tenacious commitment to the exigencies of realpoli-
tik, such unwillingness subverts the peremptory obligations of inter-
national law and perpetuates the primacy of positivist jurisprudence
over the requirements of justice. The consequences of this pattern of
international decision-making are especially visible today in the con-
text of continuing Cold War orientations to foreign affairs-a context
wherein major world powers view virtually all of the options within
the limited parameters of bipolar competition and antagonism.
Before the realism of anti-genocide ideals can prevail in a global
society, the major States in that society must learn to escape from the
confines of such a limited context for choosing policy options. Under
the aegis of present perspectives, these States have been willing to
abide virtually and evil amongst their allies in the overriding commit-
ment to geopolitical advantage. Vitalized by their misconceived intu-
itions of realpolitik, the leaders of the major world powers have
abandoned their States to the instant, to induced cathartic crises that
carry them away from their ideals and their interests at the same time.
Genocide is a crime that did not end with the Holocaust. In
Cambodia, over one million people were murdered by Pol Pot and the
Khmer Rouge during the period 1975-1979.156 In Paraguay, the
Ache Indians, a peaceful and primitive tribe that has lived for centu-
ries in the jungles of South America, are being systematically extermi-
nated by the Stroessner government and its Nazi advisers. 5 7 In
Tibet, the forces of the People's Republic of China have been engaged
in killing that threatens the extinction of the Tibetans as a national
155. Id. at 226.
156. See L. BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 125 (1987).
157. Id. at 114-115.
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and religious (Buddhist) group. 58 In South Africa, the sustained bar-
barism of the white minority apartheid government against the major-
ity black population constitutes a prima facie case of genocide.159
The world now exists outside history, in parenthesis. Ever fear-
ful of metamorphoses that represent its only hope for survival, it can
no longer abide the seductive virulence of a realpolitik orientation to
human rights. Accepting the Latin maxim jus ex injuria non oritus
(rights do not arise from wrongs), it must now grasp the immutable
principles of international law, acknowledging them as the only
proper and pragmatic standard for further global interactions.
" 'When I get to heaven,' said the Hasidic Rabbi Susya just
before his death, 'they will not ask me, Why were you not Moses?' but
'Why were you not Susya?' "60 When the major world powers con-
front the consequences of their ongoing geopolitical strategy, their
peoples will not ask, "Why were we not saints?" but "Why were we
not persons?," "Why did we not become what we could become?,"
"Why did we act in a fashion contrary to our own unique potential-
ity?," "Why did we abandon our ideals and our interests at the same
time?" Understood in terms of a dying and death-in U.S. foreign
policy, this points uncompromisingly toward a revival of personal
meaning in the United States, a revival that would supplant the deso-
late rallying-cry of anti-Sovietism with a reaffirmation of genuine
ideology.
This revival cannot begin in the realm of politics. "Politics," as
Ortega y Gasset recognized, "is a second-class occupation." 1 6'
Rather, it must begin as a rejection of a relentlessly degrading social
and cultural life. It is at home, in the schools, in the clubs, in the
churches and synagogues and in the universities that change must
begin.
For the moment, the "crowd" is not only "lonely," as David
Riesman once told US, 16 2 but also lethal. Left unchallenged as the
source of private identity, it will prod us to accept any lie with indif-
ference. Where this lie informs us that our status as Americans flows
158. Id. at 128.
159. On the particular crime of apartheid, see International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 72. See also, International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 16.
160. See L. BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD OR-
DER 83 (1984).
161. See J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, ESPARA INVERTEBRADA (1922).
162. See D. RiESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD (1961).
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from a caricatural contest with the Soviet Union, it will push us be-
yond the ambit of safety, into the icy grip of genocide.
Until now, the dangers of the crowd were thought to rest only in
the immediate effects of mob action. For example, consider the obser-
vation of Carl Jung:
[I]f... people crowd together and form a mob, then the dynamics
of the collective man are set free-beasts or demons which lie dor-
mant in every person till he is part of a mob. Man in the crowd is
unconsciously lowered to an inferior moral and intellectual level,
to that level which is always there, below the threshold of con-
sciousness, ready to break forth as soon as it is stimulated through
the formation of a crowd. 163
Jung's observation is certainly correct, but it misses an even more
essential point: that is, the crowd is always present; it produces its
terrible effects without a physical coming-together of people; it cele-
brates conformity and compliance with falsehoods even as each per-
son proceeds "independently" with his or her own affairs. The crowd
is less an assembly than a state of inconscience, a ritualized pattern of
thoughtlessness defined and sustained by officials masquerading as
leaders. What is more, these officials themselves often believe that
gibberish is truth. Captivated by the sterility of their own past, they
are usually less sinister than self-deluded.
Ortega tells us that "[i]t is not only in economics but also in met-
aphysics that man must earn his living."' 64 Acknowledging this wis-
dom, we must cease existing in the delirium of false expectations,
affirming our status not as ever-ready servitors of bile and dust but as
exemplars of uniqueness and doubt. Exploding the closed universe of
a foreign policy that indefatigably patronizes itself, we must recognize
ourselves as the essential starting point for a truly spectacular victory
as a nation, the victory of not causing countless others to perish.
Worn threadbare, militaristic nationalism must cease to be a
principal source of meaning. Its replacement, however, must be not
only authentic, but equally able to control the intensity with which
one feels his insignificance. To close what Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
calls "the spherical thinking circuit,"' 65 the prisoner of realpolitik
must learn to discover personal value in his own accomplishments, in
163. See C. Jung, Psychology and Religion, in G. LEVrrAS, THE WORLD OF PSYCHOLOGY
476-77 (1963).
164. See J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, supra note 161.
165. See PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN (1959).
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his own private characteristics and contributions. Whatever bestows
value and self-esteem, so long as it is not hurtful to others or beholden
to geopolitics, advances the conditions of dignity and an improved
world order.
None of this is to suggest that realpolitik is "caused" by behav-
ioral or psychological deficiencies, but only, that such deficiencies are
exploited for political effect in a decentralized international setting.
Were the world organized differently, in a fashion without multiple
sovereignties and zero-sum perceptions, individual human needs
would seek different sources of satisfaction. In such a world, there
could be no realpolitik, whatever such needs might happen to be. But
we do live in a fragmented world of separate States, and in this world
power politics is made possible by individual States that "feed" upon
the weakness of individual persons. There is nothing about the pres-
ent structure of international relations that makes realpolitik inevita-
ble; it comes about only because this structure combines with
behavioral conditions in a way that transforms them both.
In considering this lethal form of synergy, we must not assume
that nationalistic feelings are always corrosive, that they always ob-
struct the requirements of peace and justice. The contributions of na-
tionalism as a force against imperial arrogance and other forms of
discrimination and exploitation are well-known. It is only when this
force oversteps its worthy objective to become an agent of militarism
and mass murder that it must be curbed.
It is all a matter of what are customarily described as "stages of
development" in world political life. Up to a point, the forces of na-
tionalism represent a progressive influence, serving to supplant op-
pressive patterns of control with a legitimate expression of national
needs and prerogatives. After a time, however, these forces may be-
come retrograde, no longer serving vital human needs but rather the
contrived "interests" of States, interests that no longer bear any rela-
tion to those of individual persons. It is when this happens, when the
forces of nationalism become maladaptive, that the requirements of
"civilization" must yield to the more enduring imperatives of
planetization.
The problem was foreseen by Martin Buber in 1921.166 Speaking
as a delegate to the Twelfth Zionist Congress as a representative of the
Hitachdut-a newly formed coalition of non-Marxist socialist Zionist
166. See Buber, Nationalism, in A LAND OF Two PEOPLES: MARTIN BUBER ON JEWS
AND ARABS 52 (P. Mendes-Flohr ed. 1983).
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parties-Buber reminded the gathering that there are distinct types of
national self-assertion, including a "degenerate" kind of self-right-
eous, egocentric nationalism.167 This "hypertrophic" nationalism, as
he called it, obscures the humanity of other peoples, thus distorting
the higher purpose of nationalism. Instead of healing the afflictions of
one's own nation and those of humankind as a whole, such a posture
narrows moral consciousness and defiles all who are touched by it. 168
In Buber's words:
A nationalist development can have two possible consequences.
Either a healthy reaction will set in that will overcome the danger
heralded by nationalism, and also nationalism itself, which has
now fulfilled its purpose; or nationalism will establish itself as the
permanent principle; in other words, it will exceed its function,
pass beyond its proper bounds, and-with overemphasized con-
sciousness-displace the spontaneous life of the nation. Unless
some force arises to oppose this process, it may well be the begin-
ning of the downfall of the people, a downfall dyed in the colors of
nationalism. 169
For the United States, the problem is this nation's unwillingness
to recognize its obligation to offer more than balloons and bravado.
Strangled by an exaggerated self-centeredness, we have come to mis-
take presumption for patriotism. Led by a president whose primary
moral postulate entails threats of intervention and annihilation, we
now sustain a nationalism turned poison, a toxic predilection that
consumes us together with peoples in certain other nations.
The path to an improved foreign policy lies in a less pathological
form of nationalism. The underlying point of contention between the
super powers is not ideological or economic, but a groundless rhetoric
reinforced by self-serving elites. Indeed, as we have already seen, the
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, once spawned
and sustained by genuine considerations of purpose and power, is now
essentially a contrivance, nurtured by respective leadership bodies
who have more in common with each other than with their own
populations.
No one can be safe from genocide until the market for individual
meaning is removed from the sweating palms of the State, until it






would deny us our worth apart from the contrived dynamics of end-
less international belligerence, we must let others know that we were
persons only before our disfigurement by geopolitics and that we sur-
rendered our personhood the moment we tolerated the lies of official
thought. Once this becomes known, the suffocating and genocidal
propositions of the new theology will collapse into an incoherent
heap.
Before this can happen, however, the prophets of a new culture
of personal meaning must be willing to speak the truth. Because the
power of awareness and the power of the State are irreconcilable, a
price must be paid for honoring the former. In a world where re-
wards are bestowed upon those who allow themselves to be used as
instruments, this price is possible exile from "the good life."
But those who would be unwilling to pay this price are, by defini-
tion, unsuited for the task. Terrified to offer abilities on their own
terms, they remain marionettes of the buyer, content to degrade the
dignity of all others. More dangerous by far than those who have
been fooled by the new theology, because they understand the decep-
tion, they are the virtuous lackeys of public authority, the obedient
whores of power for whom integrity will always be unbearable.
There are other problems. The promise of an informed public
must depend upon the stature of the intellect. Yet, even as the cere-
brum is liberating itself, the intellect falls into disrepute. In the
United States, in particular, receptivity to bold, threatening ideas has
never been high.
But the problems are not insurmountable. If they were, the en-
tire enterprise of seeking a transformation of personal and political
life would be a cruel hoax, undermining the remnants of happiness
without any purpose. Acknowledging the connections between for-
eign policy and the manipulation of false needs, we can begin to un-
derstand the causes of genocide-causes that lie in suppressed
individuality and retarded personhood. Rejecting the hollow rewards
of complicity, we can still move beyond the transparent pantomime of
inter-State rivalry to a new world politics of dignity, life and hope.
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